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Abstract 
In the urban resurgence accompanying the growth of the knowledge economy, second-order 
cities appear to be losing out to the principal city, especially where the latter is much larger 
and benefits from substantially greater agglomeration economies. The view that any city can 
make itself attractive to creative talent seems at odds with the idea of a country having just 
one ‘escalator region’ where the rate of career progression is much faster, especially for in-
migrants. This paper takes the case of England, with its highly primate city-size distribution, 
and tests how its second- order cities (in size order, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, 
Newcastle, Bristol, Sheffield, Liverpool, Nottingham and Leicester) compare with London as 
human- capital escalators. The analysis is based on the ONS Longitudinal Study of linked 
census records, primarily for 1991-2001, and uses one key indicator of upward social 
mobility, the transition from White Collar Non-core to White Collar Core. For non- migrants, 
the transition rates for all the second-order cities are found to fall well short of London’s. In 
only one case – Manchester – is the rate significantly higher than the average for other areas 
outside the Greater South East (GSE) and its performance is matched by the non-London part 
of the GSE. Those moving to the second-order cities during the decade experienced much 
stronger upward social mobility than their non-migrants. This ‘migrant premium’ was 
generally similar to that for London, suggesting that it results from people moving only after 
they have secured a better job. If so, second-order cities cannot rely on the speculative 
migration of talented people but need suitable jobs ready for them to access. 
 
Keywords: human-capital escalator, second-order cities, England, ONS Longitudinal Study, 
career progression, city region  
JEL Classifications: J24, J61, J62, R23 
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 Introduction 
 
The last few years have seen an urban resurgence in many of the countries that 
experienced a major decline in city fortunes in the 1960s and 1970s (Cheshire, 2006; 
Turok and Mykhnendo, 2007). This has been put down to a combination of factors, 
including the effects of globalisation, the shift towards the quaternary sector of 
transactional activity  and a refocusing of government policy on urban regeneration 
(Dunning, 2000; Edmonds, 2003; Malecki, 2007; EU Regional Policy, 2009). Stress 
has been laid on the importance of new forms of agglomeration economies accruing to 
knowledge-based industries that cluster together (Krugman, 1996; OECD, 1996; 
Glaeser and Maré, 2001; Maskell and Malmberg, 2007). In particular, the 
concentration of high-skill labour in larger metropolitan areas is seen to enable their 
employers to make more efficient use of the available human capital, which leads to 
these cities being especially attractive to people from elsewhere who want to ‘get on’ 
in their careers (Glaeser and Saiz, 2003; Montgomery, 2006; Fielding, 2007; Florida, 
2008).   
 
The benefits of such agglomeration economies cannot, however, be expected to 
accrue equally to all large metropolitan areas (Berry and Glaeser, 2005). In principle, 
the larger the urban agglomeration, the greater is its growth potential and the more 
attractive it is to potential migrants from elsewhere, thereby leading to a cumulative 
reaction in the absence of any major checking ‘diseconomies of scale’ (Storper and 
Scott, 2009; MIER, 2009a). This line of reasoning poses an especially severe 
challenge to the economic prospects of second-order cities in countries with a primate 
city-size distribution and, most notably, in countries whose second-order cities are 
striving to throw off the legacies of the industrial era and restructure away from 
textiles, coal and steel and heavy engineering (Parkinson et al., 2012).  
 
A classic example of this situation is provided by the UK, with its pioneering of the 
industrial revolution and the growth of London as capital of the British Empire. Today 
London hugely dominates the urban system of the UK and – given that Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have some degree of political autonomy – especially 
that of England (see below). This is reflected in all the commentary on the drivers of 
the North-South divide in England (Smith, 1989; Ward, 2011), including the line of 
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research that has portrayed the South East as England’s ‘escalator region’ (starting 
with Fielding, 1992). Inter-regional migration in England is seen to pivot on London, 
with young adults being drawn there from other parts of the country so as to take 
advantage of the faster career progression there and people ‘stepping off the escalator’ 
towards the end of their working lives (Coombes and Charlton, 1992; Fielding, 1993; 
Champion et al., 2007).   
 
In the context of the urban resurgence that has taken place since the 1970s, this paper 
seeks to discover whether England’s second-order cities are managing to act as 
human-capital ‘escalators’ for their residents and also for migrants that choose them 
as their destination rather than the national capital. Is the ‘over-sized’ capital in a class 
of its own in terms of people’s pace of upward social mobility there? Or does 
England’s second tier of urban agglomerations show any signs of rivalling it in this 
respect? In short, is there any evidence that would justify aspiring young workers 
moving there rather than to London? 
 
The remainder of the paper comprises four parts. The first sets out the background to 
this line of inquiry and its English context in more detail. This is followed by a 
description and justification of the approach used in the analysis, including the related 
issues of data source and choice of career-progression metric, as well as the selection 
and definition of England’s second-order cities. The third section presents the results, 
starting with the patterns of career progression of those who stayed in the same 
agglomeration over the reference period and then analysing the fortunes of those who 
moved to them during the period. Finally, the paper provides a concluding discussion 
and suggestions for further research. 
 
 
Background to the research question 
 
In recent years there has been a considerable growth of interest among both policy 
makers and researchers in second-order cities, i.e. the tier of urban agglomerations 
immediately below the premier city (for reviews, see Parkinson et al., 2012; 
Champion and Townsend, 2013). This interest has been stimulated by the decline of 
manufacturing and the emergence of knowledge-based industries as the major 
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production sector, because the latter are seen as being most vibrant where they can 
take advantage of the greatest agglomeration economies. Such restructuring has 
prompted fears of the largest city benefitting disproportionately at the expense of the 
second-order cities.  
 
This concern about the economic prospects of second-order cities is certainly very 
evident in Europe and not least in the UK. For instance, following a major 
investigation of Europe’s ‘second-tier cities’, Parkinson et al. (2012: 82) concluded 
that, while ‘capital cities are crucially important to their national economies and must 
be able to complete in a global market’, their growth should ‘not [be] at the expense 
of everywhere else’. The risk is that over time the capitals will so dominate the urban 
system that the national economy becomes spatially and structurally unbalanced. In 
contrast to the experience of Germany, where a strong set of second-order cities was 
found to be helping to drive national economic performance, in a clear majority of EU 
countries the GDP of the second city in 2007 was less than two-fifths that of the 
national capital. On this criterion the UK lies at the other extreme from Germany, 
with its second largest urban agglomeration having less than one-eighth of the GDP of 
London: only Hungary had a lower ratio, with France and Latvia being next lowest 
after the UK.  
 
Within the UK, perhaps not surprisingly given that distance and a degree of political 
devolution promises Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland a measure of insulation 
from London, it is the situation in England that has received particular attention. 
While the problems of urban decline here have long been recognised, urban 
regeneration policies were reinvigorated by the New Labour government from 1997. 
The publication of the Rogers Report Towards an urban renaissance in 1999 was 
swiftly followed by a wide-ranging set of proposals in the White Paper Our towns and 
cities (DETR, 2000), aimed at promoting more balanced city growth across England. 
Building on this, the Sustainable Communities Plan (ODPM, 2003) established a 
planning framework for northern England focused on eight city regions and their 
principal cities (Northern Way, 2004, 2009). By this time, too, England’s eight largest 
regional cities had set themselves up as the ‘Core Cities Group’ to lobby central 
government for more funds to help them compete with the capital (Core Cities Group, 
2004). 
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Evidence-based assessments of the achievements and prospects of second-order cities 
present a very mixed picture in terms of both consistency across cities and 
sustainability over time. The Core Cities Group (2004) announced that ‘Our cities are 
back’, but Parkinson et al. (2006) concluded that the record across the 56 urban areas 
covered by their State of the English Cities report was distinctly patchy. Jones et al. 
(2006) identified Manchester as the second-order city most likely to capitalise on 
growth in the knowledge sector, with Bristol and Leeds having the next strongest 
prospects, while MIER (2009a) confirmed that Manchester possessed more jobs in 
knowledge-based industries than any other city outside London. Overman et al. 
(2009) demonstrated how improved links within northern England, especially 
between Manchester and Leeds, could build up local critical mass and reduce the 
productivity gap with London. Subsequently, the Great Recession has exposed the 
fragility of the progress that had been achieved, impacting less severely on the capital 
than the second-order cities because part of the latter’s previous growth was supported 
by increases in public expenditure that were then sharply reversed under recessionary 
conditions (ippr north, 2009; Clayton, 2011; Centre for Cities, 2012; Parkinson et al., 
2012; Champion and Townsend, 2013). It would seem that the extra policy support 
since the 1990s has not been sufficient to redress the structural weaknesses of 
England’s second-order city economies.  
 
Arguably the key challenge for cities is to attract high-quality workers to foster 
growth. Several studies including Jones et al. (2006) and MIER (2009b) have 
followed Florida (2002) in stressing the importance of the ‘creative class’ to the 
achievement of sustainable economic growth in the knowledge economy. Yet second-
order cities, especially those with a strong manufacturing tradition, face the difficulty 
of low educational aspiration in the indigenous population. Another of their problems 
is the environmental legacy of the industrial era, which can deter young aspirers from 
migrating to them from elsewhere. Indeed, second-order cities even struggle to hold 
on to their home-grown talent because of a long-standing ‘culture of migration’, 
where their high-achieving school leavers expect to move away in order to get on in 
their careers (Champion and Coombes, 2007; Houston et al., 2008; see also Work 
Foundation, 2011).  
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This process has also become an established part of migration theory. As mentioned 
in the introduction, two decades ago Fielding (1992) set out the hypothesis of the 
‘escalator region’ in which people move as young adults to the part of the country 
where they can achieve most rapid promotion and leave it later in their working lives 
or at retirement in order to live in a place with lower living costs and a better quality 
of life. His case study of England and Wales, using data for the 1971-81 intercensal 
decade, confirmed the escalator role of London and the South East: this region was 
characterised by a higher rate of upward social mobility than any other, it saw net in-
migration of young adults who managed even faster promotion than the indigenous 
population and it experienced net out-migration of older people who overall were 
downshifting in labour market terms. Subsequent studies have largely reinforced these 
findings (see Fielding, 2007; Findlay et al., 2009; Newbold and Brown, 2012; 
Champion, 2012; Gordon, 2012).   
 
The question which arises is whether the identification of a South East escalator 
region suggests that those who choose not to move there are doomed to second-class 
status in their working lives. Yet, even in Fielding’s original (1992) work, it was clear 
that these things were relative, not absolute: people living in other regions besides the 
South East did experience upward social mobility over time, but just not as quickly 
and/or surely as in the escalator region. At the urban rather than regional scale, 
Devine et al. (2003) found evidence in Manchester that it is possible to forge a 
successful professional career without moving to London, while Findlay et al. (2003, 
2008) identified considerable upward social mobility amongst migrants to Edinburgh. 
In the Canadian context, Newbold and Brown (2012) confirmed that those moving to 
Toronto achieve an income premium over that city’s indigenous population, but so too 
do migrants to Canada’s other large metropolitan areas, albeit a somewhat smaller 
one.  
 
This previous research raises the issue of how far the concept of ‘escalator region’ 
should be considered in unitary terms (i.e. one per country) rather than in relative 
terms where potentially all places can be considered to act as escalators but operating 
at different speeds. It is also possible that the macro-regional scale used in Fielding’s 
analyses has masked the existence of second-order cities providing higher than 
average rates of upward social mobility. Are there any English second-order cities that 
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rival London as places that are attractive to in-migrants? It is to answer this question 
that the present paper undertakes a systematic city-level study that compares the pace 
of career advancement in London with England’s next largest agglomerations.  
 
 
Data and methodology 
 
Three main methodological issues need to be addressed in order to assess how far 
England’s second-order cities compare with London as a human-capital ‘escalator’ for 
their residents and also for migrants who choose one of them as their destination. The 
first step must be the choice of data source, as this influences the subsequent 
decisions. The second is the decision on which of England’s urban centres constitutes 
a second-order city, along with the adoption of a valid consistent basis for delineating 
these and London on the ground. The third is the selection of the variable to be used 
to measure people’s career progression over time, along with the specification of the 
population for which this is to be calculated. 
 
The one viable data source is the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study 
(ONS-LS), which contains the anonymised records of a sample of just over one per 
cent of people enumerated in each Population Censuses of England and Wales 
between 1971 and 2001 (not 2011 at the time of writing). It has been used by the vast 
majority of the previous studies on the ‘escalator region’ phenomenon in England and 
Wales, including all the work by Fielding (see above). It comes into its own even 
more when the spatial focus is shifted from the regional to the urban scale, because 
the smaller population size of the latter unit requires a sampling fraction that is much 
higher than that of alternatives like the Labour Force Survey and British Household 
Panel Study.  
 
At the same time, the ONS-LS is not without limitations, but for the most part these 
can be worked around. Being census-based, its observations of career progression 
necessarily span the decade that occurs between each enumeration and users are 
constrained to use the Census dates (which, for instance, can and do come at different 
points in the economic cycle). Even so, a full decade is useful in that it is a long 
enough period to detect a significant change in people’s circumstances. More 
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problematically, for people migrating between Censuses, it is not possible to directly 
observe the part of any occupational change that occurred after their move and 
separate this from what may have taken place before it or indeed at the same time as 
moving (see Findlay et al., 2009).  
 
Secondly, the value of the Census records can be offset somewhat by changes 
between each enumeration in the range of topics, in the precise wording of the 
questions and in the specifications of each variable. Most crucial for this study was 
the switch in socio-economic classification from SEG to NS-SeC between 1991 and 
2001. The impact of this, however, was mitigated by the derivation of a ‘pseudo-SEG’ 
variable from the detailed occupational data in the 2001 Census. Similarly, change 
between Censuses in the geographical areas for reporting the statistics was dealt with 
by best-fitting the smallest available areas to a fixed (2001) geography of local 
authorities.  
 
A final limitation is the ONS’s policy on disclosure control. This forbids the reporting 
of small counts or any ratios based on these, with the threshold unfortunately being 
raised during the course of this study from 3 to 10, which equates to almost 1,100 
people in grossed-up form and turns out to be quite a large number in relation to 
specific occupational transitions among migrants to individual cities (see below). On 
the other hand, results based on such small numbers are less likely to be robust, so not 
being allowed to report them is not such a loss.    
 
Turning to the second issue – identifying England’s second-order cities – the aim was 
to select the largest places outside the Greater South East (GSE) defined as the former 
Government Office Regions of London, South East and East. Adopting the Primary 
Urban Area (PUA) basis used by Parkinson et al. (2006) for analysing their 56 cities, 
it was found that 9 of these contain 200,000 or more jobs, including all 8 members of 
the Core Cities Group: in rank order on this criterion, Birmingham, Manchester, 
Leeds, Newcastle, Bristol, Sheffield, Liverpool and Nottingham. Adding in the ninth 
in size, Leicester, makes the list correspond with that used by the Parkinson et al. 
(2012) study of ‘second-tier’ cities. As for defining their spatial extent, owing to the 
ONS-LS locating people by home address rather than workplace, it was important to 
set the PUA definition within a boundary including workers who commuted to these 
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jobs. This leads to a ‘city-region’ approach primarily based on commuting patterns, 
following the method developed for analyses of the 8 Core Cities (Charles et al., 
1999). Applying the same principles to Leicester and London, the resulting city 
regions are as shown in Figure 1. All mentions of ‘city’ below refer to places defined 
on this basis.  
 
Figure 1. City regions of London and 9 second-order cities 
 
 
In terms of the approach to be taken towards measuring people’s career progression, 
the analyses are crystallised by focussing on just one key occupational-status 
transition, in preference to developing an index that averaged many between-status 
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transitions or to designing a single scale that ranked people on some continuous 
indicator of occupational status. This approach affords greater transparency to the 
results, potentially guiding subsequent work using alternative formulations. There 
were two elements to the calculation of transition rate, defined as the proportion of 
people in a starting lower category moving to a higher category by the end of the 
reference period. As regards the latter, the main emphasis in the literature in this field 
(see above) has been on the uppermost level of the occupational ladder, i.e. higher 
professional and managerial work – or what Fielding (1992) termed the ‘service class’ 
– as opposed to lower-level white-collar work and manual labour. For the starting 
category, it is unhelpful to use ‘all other occupations’ because the chances of moving 
to high-level white-collar work differs considerably between them; the occupational 
composition of places varies markedly, so this effect could dominate the city-level 
likelihoods of transition. At the same time, given issues of sample size, the origin 
category needed to be quite broadly defined in order to achieve robust results. These 
considerations led to a focus on the transition from White Collar Non-core (WCN) to 
White Collar Core (WCC), with the latter being defined as SEGs 1, 3 and 4 
(employers and managers in large firms and professional workers) and WCN 
comprising the other main non-manual SEGs 2, 5.1, 5.2 and 6 (employers and 
managers in small firms, ancillary workers and artists, non-manual supervisors and 
junior non-manual).   
 
Lastly, a decision was required about the population to be included in the analysis. 
With issues of sample size in mind, the main focus is on the whole cohort of people 
who were in White Collar Non-core work at the start of the intercensal decade, merely 
restricting these to the main working-age span of 15-64, who would be aged 25-74 by 
the end of the decade. As far as sample size permitted, this could then be subdivided 
by gender and broad age group. Also, the sample was restricted to those who were 
also in employment at the end of the reference decade, so as to ensure as far as 
possible that their recorded occupational status truly reflected their situation then 
(rather than being inherited from their most recent job before leaving work, whether 
due to retirement, redundancy, ill-health or caring for family). This approach parallels 
that of Newbold and Brown (2012) who restrict their analysis to people in work. Two 
groups of people are distinguished: ‘non-migrants’ – those living in the same city 
region at the end of the decade as at its start – and ‘migrants’ – all those who moved 
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into a city region during the decade apart from those who had moved less than 40km 
(a precaution designed to filter out short cross-boundary moves).   
 
 
Results 
 
Adopting the parameters set out above, the test of how far England’s second-order 
cities compare with London as human-capital escalators is organised in two main 
steps. Following Fielding (1992), the first examines the extent to which the 10 cities 
vary in their capacity to act as escalators for their non-migrant population, based on 
the transition rate from White Collar Non-core to Core (WCN to WCC) in a decade. 
The second step applies the same metric to the migrants to each city. Here we 
compare places not only to discover how strong an escalator function they perform for 
their migrants but also to see how the latter fare relative to their non-migrants. In both 
of these steps, the examination of the whole sample is followed by a breakdown by 
gender and broad age group to check that the results are not affected by differences in 
demographic composition. Initially, the focus is on the comparison between London 
and the other 9 cities, with the latter being treated as an aggregate so as to achieve the 
most robust results, but later the cities are treated individually as far as sample size 
permits.  
 
Non-migrant transition rates for London compared with the 9 second-order cities 
combined  
 
Looking first at London, the ONS-LS sample contains 14,372 records of people who 
were living in its city region (see Figure 1) in both 1991 and 2001, were aged 16-64 in 
1991 and engaged in WCN work at that time and were also in work 10 years later, 
these being equivalent to almost 1.6 million when grossed up. A total of 2,270 of 
these LS members had moved up to a WCC occupation by 2001, i.e. 15.8 per cent of 
the WCN starters. This ‘transition rate’ compares with one of 12.2 per cent for the 
other 9 cities combined, which is very similar to the 12.4 per cent for the rest of 
England and Wales. This suggests that – at least at the scale of this 3-fold 
geographical division – London was in a class of its own in providing a greater than 
average chance of this career progression in 1991-2001, while the second-order cities 
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offer no advantage over the rest of the country. Thus, compared to the second-order 
cities’ aggregate, the chances of making this transition were 30 per cent higher in 
London. The transition rate for these three zones combined is 13.1 per cent, which 
means a 20 per cent higher rate of upward transition for London than nationally while 
the 9 other cities combined are 7 per cent below it.  
 
These results conform quite closely to Fielding’s findings, despite the latter being 
generated by a somewhat different approach in terms of both geography and 
occupational grouping and relating to an earlier decade. For the former South East 
Standard Region, Fielding (1992) found that the chances of non-migrants moving 
from Working Class (including blue collar and unemployed as well as lower-level 
white collar) to Professional and to Manager were, respectively, 21 and 29 per cent 
above the norm for England and Wales as a whole. In fact, application of the present 
study’s methodology to the non-migrants of the two previous intercensal decades 
(Figure 2) reveals not only that London’s superiority as a place where these people 
can get on in their careers has survived the many significant changes in labour-market 
conditions that have occurred since the 1970s but also that the scale of this margin has 
steadily widened over time.  
 
Can demographic composition help to explain this difference in transition rate 
between the second-order cities and London, with the latter containing more of the 
types of people who tend to progress more quickly in their working lives, notably 
younger people? Certainly, London’s population is known to have been rejuvenating 
itself since the 1970s, as a result of the combined effects of older people leaving, of 
younger adults moving in and of increasing numbers of births (Champion, 2006; 
Gordon, 2010). Nevertheless, Figure 3 shows that the ‘London premium’ remains 
largely intact in analyses distinguishing four broad age groups and also in those that 
split males from females. Overall, women display lower transition rates than men, as 
do those aged 35 or over in 1991 (45 and over by 2001) compared to the two younger 
groups. But it is clear that London systematically outperforms the second-order cities’ 
aggregate for both men and women and for all the age groups shown, albeit it by a 
smaller margin for the oldest one.  
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Figure 2. WCN-to-WCC transition rates for non-migrants in work at both the start and 
the end of the reference decade (Source: calculated from ONS-LS data. Crown 
copyright.) 
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Figure 3. WCN-to-WCC transition rates, 1991-2001, for non-migrants in work at both 
the start and the end of the reference decade, by population group (Source: calculated 
from ONS-LS data. Crown copyright.) 
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Migrant transition rates for London compared with the 9 second-order cities 
combined  
 
The second step – looking at the equivalent transition rates for these places’ migrants 
(as defined above) – might be considered a superfluous exercise, given the difference 
in career progression between London and the rest of the country just observed. After 
all, why should any WCN starters living outside the 10 cities in 1991 go to all the cost 
and disruption of moving to a second-order city where their chances of transition to 
WCC would appear to be no higher, especially when London offers clearly superior 
odds? Yet many did. In all, there were 5,586 people in our sample (over 610,000 
grossed up) who were living in one of the 9 second-order cities in 2001 but had been 
living elsewhere in England and Wales in 1991 and, of these, 22 per cent (1,231) were 
working in a WCN occupation in 1991 and were still in some type of job in 2001.  
 
The literature (see above, also Boyle et al., 1998) points to several reasons why 
people might make such a move despite the apparently less favourable conditions. 
Perhaps the most obvious explanation is that they did not have access to this sort of 
information about the poorer chances of career progression there than in London. A 
second possibility is that some of the migrants are leaving London after making as 
much headway in their working lives there as they had aimed to; in terms of 
Fielding’s original (1992) model, ‘stepping off the escalator’ at a later stage of their 
working lives so as to cash in on their rewards and enjoy a less pressured lifestyle. Yet 
others could be moving for reasons unconnected with work, such as to be closer to 
family and friends. There is also the possibility that some of the 9 second-order cities 
offer much better career progression prospects than the norm for these, maybe even as 
good as London’s, and that their migrant population is concentrated in these more 
promising cities.  
 
While we check on the last of these explanations below and acknowledge that 
previous studies provide evidence in support of each of the other explanations, the 
reality is that migrants to the second-order cities actually managed to progress faster 
as a group than would be expected from the non-migrant transition rates described 
above. Of the 1,231 WCN starters, 273 had progressed to WCC jobs by 2001. This 
transition rate of 22.2 per cent is very much higher than the 12.2 per cent rate for the 
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second-order cities’ non-migrants. Moreover, it is substantially above the rate for the 
equivalent group moving into the rest of England and Wales from all 10 cities (19.7 
per cent), though well short of the 26.0 per cent rate for those moving into London 
during the decade.   
 
Compositional effects need to be considered when comparing the second-order cities’ 
migrants with their non-migrants. Given that migration tends to be a selective process, 
Table 1 breaks down the migrant transition rates by gender and age and compares 
them with the non-migrant rates that formed the basis of Figure 3 (excluding those 
aged 50-64 in 1991 because of small sample size for migrants).  
 
 
Table 1. White Collar Non-core to Core transition rates, 1991-2001, for migrants and 
non-migrants: London and the 9 second-order cities combined, by population group 
Group with age 
in 1991 City  
Non-
migrants Migrants 
Migrant 
premium 
     
All 15-64 London  15.8 26.0 10.2 
 Second-order cities 12.2 22.2 10.0 
 London premium 3.6 3.8  
     
Males 15-64 London  23.1 37.3 14.2 
 Second-order cities 18.5 32.3 13.8 
 London premium  4.6 5.0  
     
Females 15-64 London  10.1 15.6 5.5 
 Second-order cities 8.2 13.4 5.2 
 London premium 1.9 2.3  
     
All 15-24 London  17.0 27.5 10.6 
 Second-order cities 13.1 22.6 9.5 
 London premium 3.8 4.9  
     
All 25-34 London  18.6 25.6 7.1 
 Second-order cities 14.6 21.9 7.3 
 London premium 4.0 3.8  
     
All 35-49 London  14.3 24.2 9.9 
 Second-order cities 10.7 22.9 12.2 
 London premium 3.7 1.4  
Source: calculated from ONS Longitudinal Study data. Crown copyright.  
 
It can be seen that the second-order cities’ transition rate for migrants is higher than 
the non-migrant one for each of the population groups. The same is also the case for 
London. Moreover, the ‘migrant premium’ for the second-order cities is virtually 
identical to London’s for all persons and varies more or less in tandem with London’s 
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across the population groups. These results suggest that it is the general norm for 
migrants to get on better in their careers than non-migrants and that this must be 
related to some other factor(s) besides those of gender, age and starting occupational 
level allowed for here – an issue revisited in the discussion below.  
 
Table 1 also permits a cross-group comparison of transition rates between those 
migrating to a second-order city and those going to London as well as facilitating a 
comparison of this ‘London premium’ with that of the non-migrants’ performances 
already described. For all the population groups shown, the migrants’ transition rates 
are always higher for London than for the second-order cities, just as is the case for 
the non-migrants’ rates. Impressively, for the most part the two sets of differences 
move in parallel, reinforcing the image of similarity given by the all-persons’ 
differences of 3.6 and 3.8 percentage points for non-migrants and migrants 
respectively. For instance, the London/second-order-city difference of 5.0 points for 
migrant males is not much greater than the 4.6 for non-migrants, while the differences 
for those aged 25-34 in 1991 (becoming 35-44 in 2001) are even more closely 
matched. While the migrant/non-migrant differences are somewhat wider apart for 
those aged 15-24 and 35-49, the overall impression is of the difference between 
London and the second-order cities in the chances of progression from WCN to WCC 
being about the same for their recent in-migrants as for their longer-term populations. 
 
The 10 cities compared 
 
The role of place can be probed further by examining the 9 second-order cities 
individually and comparing their transition rates with London’s. Table 2 shows the 
transition rates for all those who were living in a particular city at both dates and those 
who moved to it from elsewhere in England and Wales during the decade. The cities 
are arranged in size order so as to help check for agglomeration effects. As a further 
refinement, the rest of the country is subdivided into the rest of the GSE (see above) 
and the remainder, as the latter constitutes a more valid benchmark for the 
performance of the 9 provincial cities which lie outside this generally prosperous 
region.  
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Table 2. White Collar Non-core to Core transition rates, 1991-2001, for migrants and 
non-migrants: 10 cities ranked by size, Rest of Greater South East (GSE) and Rest of 
England and Wales (E&W) 
City region 
 
Size (000s) 
Non-
migrants Migrants 
Migrant 
premium 
     
London 4,448 15.8* 26.0* 10.2 
     
Birmingham 1,047 11.8 21.7 9.9 
Manchester 878 13.9* 20.7 6.7 
Leeds 397 12.1 26.0 13.9 
Newcastle 365 11.3 15.2 4.0 
Bristol 361 11.7 21.4 9.7 
Sheffield 337 12.2 22.4 10.2 
Liverpool 335 10.7 20.0 9.3 
Nottingham 281 11.7 21.1 9.4 
Leicester 208 13.3 27.0 13.7 
     
9 second-order cities n/a 12.2 22.2 10.0 
     
Rest of GSE n/a 13.2* 21.1 7.9 
Rest of E&W n/a 11.5 19.4 7.9 
     
Note: Size is based on total number of employees working in the city’s Primary Urban Area in 2001 
(see section on methodology);  
* difference from Rest of E&W significant at 5% (t-test).  
Source: calculated from ONS Longitudinal Study data. Crown copyright.  
 
 
Looking first at how strongly places perform as escalators of human capital for their 
non-migrant populations, it can be seen (from the first two data columns of Table 2) 
that agglomeration effects operate on at least a partial basis. None of the second-order 
cities has a higher non-migrant transition rate than London, while Manchester ranks in 
second place, which is close to its size ranking. Beyond this, however, the relationship 
is less clear, with the third highest transition rate being for Leicester, the smallest of 
the cities. There is then a gap before a middle group of 5 cities – including second 
city, Birmingham, but also Nottingham, the second smallest – that cluster in the 
narrow range of 11.7 to 12.2 per cent, while Liverpool and Newcastle – both 
considerably larger than Nottingham and Leicester – come at the bottom of the 
transition-rate ranking, even below the 11.5 per cent rate for the rest of the country 
outside the GSE. Indeed, allowing for sample size, t test results show that, of the 9 
second-order cities, only Manchester has a rate significantly above that 11.5 per cent 
benchmark. Nevertheless, across the 10 cities calculations suggest a degree of size 
effect, with a correlation coefficient of 0.73 between the transition rate and the log of 
number of jobs, which is significant at the 5 per cent level and indicates that the latter 
can account for around half the between-place variance in the former.  
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Turning to the migrants, it might have been expected from the previous 3-zone 
analysis that there would be a stronger role for agglomeration effects, given that the 
migrant transition rate was seen to fall not just from London to the 9 second-order 
cities combined but also from them to the aggregate of the smaller labour markets that 
make up the rest of the country. On the contrary, however, the pattern for migrants 
shown in Table 2 (third data column) is found to be less related to size than the one 
for non-migrants. London does not stand above all the others, but on a par with it are 
Leeds and Leicester rather than the second- or third-largest cities. Overall, the 
correlation between the migrants’ transition rate and the log of number of jobs is only 
0.21, well below the 0.63 level required for 5 per cent significance with just 10 cases. 
Moreover, London is the only place where t test results show that migrants fare 
significantly better than those moving to the non-GSE rest of England. 
 
A related question concerns the extent to which the fortunes of the migrants are 
affected by the differences between the 10 cities in their ability to perform as 
escalators for their non-migrants. The correlation coefficient between the transition 
rates of the migrants and non-migrants, at 0.57, is positive but not significant at the 5 
per cent level. Instead, what is most remarkable about the migration premiums shown 
for the 10 cities in Table 2 is how similar they are, with the majority falling in the 
narrow band of 9.3-10.2 and with none differing significantly from the rest of England 
and Wales. This suggests more of a flat-rate bonus for the migrants in that, 
irrespective of the actual performance of each city’s escalator, an additional 10 per 
cent or so of the WCNs ‘stepping on to these escalators’ achieve WCC status 
compared to the progress made by these places’ longer-term residents. This migrant 
premium is therefore not just associated with a move to London, but applies to other 
destinations too. This observation helps to explain why, despite most of these second-
order cities performing less strongly as escalators than London, people of working age 
are still prepared to move to them.  
 
From this, too, arises the question as to just how sensitive is migration to these 
between-place differences in career progression prospects. The ability of London to 
draw in people at the early stage of their working lives was the second main criterion 
in Fielding’s original escalator test, after the transition rate for non-migrants. To 
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investigate this, we focus on the migration behaviour of the cohort of people aged 15-
24 in 1991 (25-34 in 2001), thereby avoiding the student migration effect (assuming 
that almost all of those moving to these cities for their higher education and not 
staying on afterwards will have left before their 25
th
 birthday). The rate of migration 
of this age cohort into the 10 cities over the decade varies enormously, ranging from 
just 7.3 per cent for Liverpool to 24.3 per cent for Bristol, and with a substantial 
margin separating the other stronger performers (Leicester, London, Nottingham and 
Leeds, all with rates of at least 15 per cent) from the remaining four (Manchester, 
Sheffield, Newcastle and Birmingham, with rates of around 10 per cent or lower).  
 
Figure 4 reveals how far this difference in migration performance across the 10 cities 
corresponds to the patterning of the WCN-to-WCC transition rates for both their non-
migrant and migrant populations, shown in charts (a) and (b) respectively. In both 
cases, the relationship is positive, indicating that the cities’ relative drawing power is 
broadly in line with the chances of promotion there. The statistical correlation is 
higher in terms of the migrants’ transition rate than the non-migrants’ one, but at 0.52 
is still not significant at the 5 per cent level. On the other hand, the pattern in Figure 
4(b) suggests quite a close fit for 7 of the cities including London, with just Bristol – 
plus Nottingham and Newcastle to a lesser extent – attracting more of this key group 
of people than expected from their chances of career progression.    
 
 21 
Figure 4. Relationship between the 1991-2001 in-migration rate of those aged 15-24 
in 1991 and the 1991-2001 WCN-to-WCC transition rates of (a) non-migrants and (b) 
migrants (Source: calculated from ONS-LS data. Crown copyright.) 
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Discussion 
 
This paper has examined the extent to which England’s second-order cities perform a 
role akin to the ‘regional escalator’ function previously observed for London’s region, 
using data from the ONS Longitudinal Study (ONS LS) and focusing on one key 
indicator of occupational mobility, namely moving up from White Collar Non-core 
(WCN) to White Collar Core (WCC) during an intercensal decade. This final section 
summarises the main findings and discusses their significance. The results are seen to 
confirm the value of tracking people’s spatial mobility alongside their social mobility 
over time, but also raise questions which require further research.   
 
The first main finding is that, while many people rise in occupational status as they 
age through a decade, their chances of doing so vary according to both the type of 
person they are and the type of place they live in. At the same time, between-place 
differences in the WCN-to-WCC transition rates are not caused by compositional 
factors, or at least not by the ones allowed for here – namely the gender, age and 
occupational make-up of their populations – though it is conceivable that some other 
facet of socio-demographic structure may play a part. The latter point aside, it would 
seem that, as far as the non-migrant population is concerned, the 9 second-order cities 
as a group did fall well short of London in terms of this transition rate for 1991-2001 
and in fact fared no better than the rest of the country, while London’s margin over 
them has widened since the 1970s. Taking the 9 separately, however, a considerable 
range of performance is found that can partly be explained in terms of agglomeration 
effects and, among them, there is one – Manchester – that posts a transition rate which 
justifies it being seen as a ‘mini London’ in the opportunities it offers its residents. 
 
A rather different picture, however, has emerged when considering these places as 
potential escalators for migrants to ‘step on to’. People going to a second-order city, 
on average, fare better than those moving to the rest of the country, especially if the 
latter is restricted to the part beyond the GSE. Moreover, the migrants do better than 
the non-migrant populations of their destination areas, wherever these are, for reasons 
that are not simply a matter of their relative youth. On the basis of this evidence, it 
seems that migrants anywhere show faster progress and that, on top of this migration 
premium, those going to Manchester – as well as to London or the rest of the GSE – 
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can also expect to enjoy the escalator effects evident among longer-term residents of 
these areas. 
 
So, what is it that helps to make these second-order cities act as escalators for their 
migrant populations almost as well as London, given that they perform less well for 
their non-migrants? It does not seem to have anything to do with migrant selectivity in 
terms of gender, age and occupational status at the start of the reference period. One 
potentially important factor is what Gordon (2012) terms ‘ambition’ and which he has 
estimated using attitudinal questions asked by the British Household Panel Study (but 
not available in the census-derived data in the ONS-LS). It seems plausible that it is 
only the more ambitious, able and enterprising among those in WCN jobs that are 
prepared to up sticks and take the risk of a long-distance move to another area.  
 
Alternatively, maybe this outcome has more to do with the way in which much of the 
job search and staff recruitment process works nowadays, at least in relation to the 
higher-skilled sections of the labour market. Fewer people are now engaging in 
speculative migration in search of work, while more are moving home only after they 
have been successful in their job search and even then may delay making a permanent 
move and instead commute on a weekly basis. Also, employers may be reluctant to 
appoint a person from a distance unless they cannot find a suitable candidate in their 
local area or if the more distant applicant is much better suited. Another reason behind 
longer-distance labour migration that is now seen as more important than in the past is 
the relocation of continuing employees between the branches of multi-site firms and 
government agencies, which in many cases would be associated with staff promotion 
(see Findlay et al., 2003).   
 
These possible explanations, in their various ways, raise questions about the nature of 
a labour-market ‘escalator’ and what exactly drives the migration of people towards it, 
with such issues relating just as much to the archetypal escalator of London as to 
second-order cities. The original model is based on the premise that, in moving to a 
place like London, people advance their careers faster than staying where they were 
living previously because they are able to ‘ride’ the faster-moving escalator at their 
destination alongside the local residents, with the overall effect presumably increasing 
the longer the in-migrant lives there. More recent research (Findlay et al., 2009) 
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argues that this combination of spatial and social mobility should be broken down into 
two elements; namely, the immediate change in occupational status at the time of 
‘stepping on the escalator’ and the change which takes place subsequently while 
‘riding the escalator’. Fielding's analogy with an escalator emphasises the latter 
component. With data for a single (extended) period, however, there is no direct way 
of determining how much of the advances achieved by migrants are attributable to 
each of these separate potential components of career progression. 
 
In conclusion, it would be over-hasty to treat the observed ‘migration premium’ as a 
validation of policies seeking to speed up the economic growth of second-order cities 
through attracting more migrant talent along the lines proposed by Florida (2002). If it 
is the case that most of the migration of human capital into these cities takes place 
only after a job has been secured, then any attempt to increase migration to them 
would require an initial policy package to create employment growth there. There is 
therefore a strong case for investigating how the phasing of migrants’ change in 
occupational status relates to the time at which they moved. Beyond this, research 
should attempt a fuller like-for-like comparison of migrants and non-migrants that 
takes into account the effect on career trajectories of ‘ambition’ and other personal 
characteristics not allowed for in the present study. Thirdly, this study has focused on 
just one occupational transition, albeit a key one in relation to the totality of longer-
distance migration as well as to places’ economic fortunes: a case can be made for 
focusing on other starting occupational levels besides WCN, as well as one for 
examining the chances of downward as well as upward social mobility, even to the 
extent of using a single scale of job-status change like that developed by Gordon 
(2012). Finally, given that urban regeneration programmes continued after 2001, 
opportunity should be taken of the incorporation of the 2011 Census data into the 
ONS-LS (due for release in 2014) for discovering whether the most recent decade has 
seen any narrowing of London's advantage over the second-order cities as a human-
capital escalator. 
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